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THE UNCONVENTIONAL USES OF TRANSACTION COSTS
David Gilo and Ariel Porat*

Boilerplate: Foundations of Market Contract
(Cambridge University Press, O. Ben Shahar ed.) (forthcoming 2007)

Introduction
Standard-form contracts offered to consumers contain numerous terms and
clauses, most of which are ancillary to the main terms of the transaction. We call these
ancillary terms “boilerplate provisions.” Since most consumers do not read boilerplate
provisions, or find them hard to understand, courts are suspicious of harsh boilerplate
provisions and sometimes strike them down. Many law-and-economics scholars agree
that striking down harsh clauses included in boilerplate language is justified when
there is asymmetry of information between the supplier and consumers with respect to
the harsh clause, which precludes consumers from fully understanding the effects of
the clause on their legal rights. In such cases, there is a risk that the supplier will
extract payment from the consumer without the latter being aware of the fact the
payment does not reflect the reduction of value due to the harsh clause.
In this Chapter we argue that boilerplate provisions and standard-form
contracts with the transaction costs that they generate are used—or could be used—by
suppliers for purposes other than for extracting payments from consumers through
harsh clauses. Some of these uses are efficient and some are inefficient. What all these
uses have in common is that their virtue to the supplier lies in the transaction costs
imposed upon consumers, from which the supplier expects to gain. However, in
contrast to the familiar use of boilerplate provisions as creating asymmetry of
information between the supplier and consumers, we discuss cases in which the
asymmetry of information is not necessarily between the supplier and consumers, but
rather between different kinds of consumers or between consumers and
nonconsumers. We also discuss cases in which the supplier could gain from the
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transaction costs imposed on consumers even absent any kind of information
asymmetries.
We identify four main categories of cases, characterized by the different goals
suppliers might try to achieve by imposing transaction costs on consumers. In the first
category of cases the supplier uses boilerplate provisions and other contractual terms
for segmentation of consumers. By creating transaction costs that some consumers are
willing to bear while others are not, suppliers could screen out unwanted consumers,
discriminate in prices by conferring benefits only on consumers who incur the
transaction costs, hide benefits conferred upon one group of consumers from the eyes
of another group, and receive information about consumers’ preferences. In the
second category of cases the supplier uses boilerplate provisions for stabilization of
cartels, obstruction of competition among suppliers and as an anticompetitive
signaling device. Suppliers achieve these goals by using boilerplate language to make
their contracts complex and by hiding beneficial terms in boilerplate provisions,
making them available only to consumers who are ready to incur transaction costs. In
the third category of cases the supplier imposes transaction costs in order to create a
facade of a contract that is different than its true nature, thereby escaping legal or
public scrutiny. In the fourth and last category of cases, the supplier uses standardform contracts to create self-inflicted transaction costs that credibly signal that the
contract, or some of its terms, are not negotiable. This credible signal is conveyed to
consumers as well to competitors, for different purposes.
The various uses of boilerplate language and standard-form contracts to
generate transaction costs raise the question of whether these uses are desirable from a
social perspective. We discuss some policy implications and demonstrate how certain
doctrines and principles of antitrust law, consumer law, contracts, and torts could be
applied to cope with the harsh effects of beneficial boilerplate terms that we identify.

I. Segmentation of Consumers
A. Screening Consumers Out
At times, the supplier is not interested in transacting with all consumers but
only with certain segments that are more profitable. She could screen out unwanted
consumers by inflicting high transaction costs upon them, thereby making the
transaction prohibitively costly for them. For example, an Israeli landlord who offers
apartments for rent and wants to exclude ethnic Arabs, can draft all contracts in
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Hebrew, thus raising transaction costs for non-Hebrew speakers and deterring Arabs
from transacting with him. Or, a supplier who wishes to attract repeat or large buyers
(for whom it is cost-effective to incur set-up costs and to reach sale volume targets)
can raise transaction costs for all consumers by complicating the boilerplate language
or the contracting stage as a whole. Only consumers who expect high enough gains or
who could economize on the transaction costs would incur them, and typically those
would be the repeat or large consumers. For various reasons, that we elaborate upon
elsewhere, suppliers are expected sometimes to prefer using transaction costs to using
a subscription fee, even though transaction costs constitute a net loss to both sides of
the contract, while a subscription fee raises the supplier’s revenue.1
In other cases, the supplier is concerned about “risky” consumers, who would
not fulfill their part of the deal, or otherwise burden the supplier. Ideally, the supplier
could charge them higher prices, or collect damages from them when they fail to
perform their part of the contract. Practically, when it is hard to directly observe
consumer types, requiring consumers to pass the test of high transaction costs could
often be a better choice. For example, short-term employment contracts and rental
contracts require applicants to fill out long forms that differ from each other for each
and every workplace or lease.2
Note that using transaction costs and standard-form contracts to screen out
unwanted consumers could be sustainable even when the supplier faces intense
competition from other suppliers. First, in some cases, as in the example of using
contracts in Hebrew to exclude Arabs, many consumers the supplier wishes to retain
do not bear considerable transaction costs, and therefore competing suppliers could
not steal such consumers on account of such transaction costs. Second, even in cases
in which consumers the supplier wishes to retain do bear some transaction costs, they
can potentially enjoy the fact that other consumers are excluded. Accordingly, they
may well prefer the supplier to competitors who do not screen out unwanted
consumers via transaction costs.

1
2.

See Gilo and Porat, MLR Article, at note 15 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Educational Housing Services, http://www.studenthousing.org/ (last visited Dec. 2,
2005). See also job search sites on the Internet, Monster, http://www.monster.com (last visited Jan. 8,
2006), and Career Builder, http://www.careerbuilder.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2006).
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B. Price Discrimination
A supplier of uniform goods and services may find it beneficial to discriminate
in prices in order to extract more surplus from consumers. But price discrimination
could be prohibited by law, or hard to implement because it requires information
about consumers’ willingness to pay. Suppliers would therefore try to use
approximations for consumers’ willingness to pay. They do so in many familiar ways.
Airlines charge consumers higher prices for short stays, knowing that most shortjourney travelers are businesspeople who are willing to pay higher prices. Or, many
vendors distribute free coupons, entitling their holders to discounts, knowing that
most of those who spend time collecting coupons have a lower willingness to pay.
Boilerplate provisions can serve a similar sorting function, facilitating price
discrimination. .For example, a seller of a relatively cheap product might offer in a
boilerplate provision a special discount if consumers fill out a certain form and mail it
back to the supplier. Only consumers who bear the transaction costs will get the
special discount, and those are typically the ones whose willingness to pay is lower,
and would not have bought the product at the posted price absent the beneficial term.
Had the beneficial term been more salient, many other consumers would have also
received the discount too, and the supplier’s overall profits would have diminished.
Of course, this proxy of consumers’ willingness to pay is an imperfect one. In
particular, some consumers who do not incur the transaction costs would not be
willing to pay the posted price absent the discount. Conversely, some consumers who
incur the transaction costs would buy the product even absent the discount but
nevertheless incur them because they gain more than others from doing so or are more
sophisticated and well-informed consumers.
A common example is hiding a best-price-guarantee in the boilerplate. Another
example is the case of selling goods with an option to return and receive a refund if
later the consumer changes his mind for any reason. A similar practice is common in
subscription sales. For example, Internet service providers often have a boilerplate
provision granting customers an option to cancel within a certain period of time and
get their money back.3 Many customers are not aware of this option, hidden in the fine
3

See, for example, the boilerplate terms of sale of Speakeasy, offering broadband Internet services:
“Speakeasy offers a 25-day Trial Period on all ADSL services . . . . If you feel that you must cancel
within 25 calendar days of your Activation Date you may do so without being subject to a
Disconnection Fee.” Speakeasy, Terms of Service (Sept. 28, 2005), http://www.speakeasy.net/tos/ (last
visited Dec. 1, 2005).
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print, and do not execute it. But it is those who are more hesitant about signing up that
would tend to incur the transaction costs and explore the boilerplate. They will be the
ones disproportionately utilizing the benefit.
Conferring benefits only upon those who know how to appreciate them is the
mirror image of the familiar use of harsh boilerplate terms set by the supplier in order
to extract surplus from consumers, without them being aware of it. There, the supplier
incorporates a boilerplate term hoping that most consumers will not be able to
estimate their negative effect. In the beneficial-terms case, however, those who do not
appreciate the beneficial terms and therefore do not receive them cannot argue that
their expectations were frustrated: they got exactly what they expected to get. This is
in contrast to the familiar use of harsh boilerplate terms, where the main concern is
that the consumer expected a different contract than the one she actually got.
Conferring benefits through boilerplate to consumers who are less willing to
pay can be preferable to offering them a direct discount because it avoids reputational
sanctions or retaliation by frustrated consumers who have not enjoyed the benefits
offered to other consumers. For example, this technique can be used to draw new
customers by offering them better deals than those granted to old consumers. Instead
of explicitly limiting the applicability of beneficial terms to new consumers and
offending old faithful consumers, the supplier could hide the beneficial term in
boilerplate, and exercise it selectively only to a subset of consumers.
Another strategy that could lead to price discrimination is to raise transaction
costs by complicating the contract offered to consumers, without using beneficial
terms at all. Cellular phone contracts are a good example. Consumers face a menu of
packages, each different with regard to rate per minute, monthly fee, night rate, and so
forth, in a way that it is difficult for a consumer to calculate which package is better.
Those who would incur the transaction costs and get the better deals are probably
those who use their cellular phones more and therefore have more to gain from
thoroughly exploring all of the available options. They could also be the more
sophisticated consumers, who can easily understand the differences among the various
options and choose the one most suitable to their needs. Here, the supplier is using
complicated boilerplate in order to offer better deals to high-volume or sophisticated
users, who would often be more sensitive to the price they are required to pay.
Yet another boilerplate-based strategy to achieve price discrimination is to
induce the consumer to rely and depend on the supplier for on going assistance.
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Dependency often results in the purchase of more services and products. For example,
suppliers of computer accessories and programs can distribute manuals that are
inaccessible to unsophisticated users.4 If the unsophisticated (or inexperienced)
consumers are less sensitive to the price or less aware of the additional price they
would have to pay for the supplier’s assistance, the supplier could extract payments
from these consumers that she would not have been able to extract but for the
transaction costs she artificially created. At the same time, the supplier manages to
retain sophisticated consumers with a lower willingness to pay.
Could these forms of price discrimination—through benefits, complexity, and
dependency generated in the boilerplate terms—survive competitive pressures? The
more artificial and cumbersome are the transaction costs readers need to incur,
competing suppliers would tend to reduce the level of these transaction costs in order
to steal readers from one another. If the market is competitive enough and there are
enough readers, such competitive pressures could reduce the transaction costs
imposed on all consumers to zero so that discrimination between readers and
nonreaders is dissipated. However, when there are only a few suppliers in the market,
discrimination via boilerplate could still be sustained through collusion between
suppliers or when some suppliers enjoy market power. Such market power could
stem, for example, from product differentiation5 or from capacity constraints.6

C. Hiding Benefits Granted to Selected Consumers
Sometimes there are privileged consumers who are entitled to benefits beyond
what most consumers expect. The supplier would often like to understate these
benefits, by placing them in boilerplate language, in order to avoid frustrating the
consumers who do not receive them.
An illustrative example is benefits granted by airlines to Frequent Fliers. In the
forms that establish the relationships between the airlines and the passengers, the
privileges for frequent flyers are understated. However, the airlines directly mail
frequent flyers all the relevant details concerning the privileges they are entitled to.
4.

The “Help” devices of Microsoft Office programs are too complicated for some users, who would
prefer to pay for support or to learn about operation of the programs in special courses.
5.
With product differentiation, readers that prefer the supplier’s brand to competing brands will be
willing to incur some transaction costs and stick with the supplier’s brand. See generally Jean Tirole,
The Theory of Industrial Organization 280 (1988).
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D. Collecting Information about Consumers Preferences
Suppliers would often like consumers to reveal not only their willingness to
pay, as discussed in previous sections of this chapter, but other preferences as well.
This information helps suppliers market their products and services to new consumers
and to update strategies vis-à-vis their existing consumers. Occasionally, boilerplate
language and the imposition of transaction costs could help extract this information
from consumers. For example, a cellular phone provider could offer additional
services for free but make them available through a process that requires consumers to
read and learn instructions placed in boilerplate language, or to fill out long and timeconsuming forms. Had the cellular phone company not conditioned the availability of
the various services upon incurring the transaction costs, most consumers would order
these services and the cellular phone company would know very little about their true
preferences. Using the transaction costs strategy could occasionally be more effective
than charging consumers for the services they order, since the latter strategy could be
more costly to administer, more deterring for many consumers, or raise consumers’
suspicion with regard to the supplier's motives.

II. Prevention of Competition and Cartel Stabilization
Explicit collusion between competitors is prohibited by antitrust law. But firms
often try to sustain higher-than-competitive prices even absent explicit coordination,
through what is known as tacit collusion. Tacit collusion is possible when firms
independently find it unprofitable to deviate from a collusive price.. A growing body
of the antitrust literature is devoted to identifying practices that facilitate the
sustainability of tacit collusion.7

A. Making It Difficult to Compare among Rivals
The complexity of boilerplate is a method that can help firms promote
anticompetitive goals, in at least three ways.

6.

In the case of capacity constraints, suppliers cannot reduce transaction costs imposed upon
readers to zero, since then they would not have the capacity to serve all readers that would flow to
them.. See generally id. at 215–16.
7
See, e.g., David Gilo, The Anticompetitive Effect of Passive Investment, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 1718 (2000); David Gilo, Yossi Moshe & Yossi Spiegel, Partial Cross Ownership and Tacit Collusion, 37
RAND J. ECON. 81 (2006); Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints with Horizontal Consequences:
Competitive Effects of “Most-Favored-Customer” Clauses, 64 Antitrust L.J. 517 (1996).
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1. Facilitation of Collusion and Raising Prices. If most firms in a market offer
noncompetitive terms, and their contracts with consumers are complex, the profits one
of them could make by offering more competitive terms are small, since many
consumers would find it difficult to assess whether the complex terms offered by their
current supplier are better than the competing offer. Stealing a substantial number of
customers would require an extreme and salient benefit, which is less profitable. Note
that unlike consumers, the firms themselves would not find it hard to assess whether
their rival has deviated from a collusive equilibrium, since they are sophisticated and
have a lot at stake. Hence, complexity facilitates ongoing (tacit or explicit) collusion
between rivals.8
2. Raising Prices even Absent Collusion. Complexity of boilerplate also typically
raises the prices that would prevail absent collusion. As is well known, in markets
with only a few firms, even absent ongoing collusion, prices will often exceed
marginal costs. Common reasons for this are product differentiation (i.e., consumers
do not see the competing products as perfect substitutes) and capacity constraints (i.e.,
firms are not able to lower prices all the way down to marginal costs, due to their
capacity constraints). Consumers’ difficulties in fully understanding the value they get
from a supplier, and their consequent difficulties in comparing suppliers can enable
suppliers in such industries, even absent collusion, to raise prices even further above
marginal costs. Indeed, various economic models find that elevated search costs,
which consumers need to bear in order to compare between competing suppliers, have
the effect of raising prices in oligopolies, even absent ongoing collusion.9
3. Entry Deterrence. Complexity of contracts can also serve as a barrier to entry of
new firms into the market. A new entrant would find it hard to steal customers away
from the incumbent firms, because their customers would find it hard to verify that the
entrant is offering them a better deal.

8.

Note that not all firms need to offer complex contracts in order for the anticompetitive effects of
complexity to exist. As long as complexity is abundant enough, it would be useless for a rival offering a
simple contract to try to steal customers from suppliers who offer complex contracts.
9.
See Simon P. Anderson & Régis Renault, Pricing, Product Diversity, and Search Costs: A
Bertrand-Chamberlin-Diamond Model, 30 RAND J. Econ. 719 (1999) (showing that prices in
oligopoly rise when search costs rise); Christopher R. Knittel, Interstate Long Distance Rates: Search
Costs, Switching Costs, and Market Power, 12 Rev. Indus. Org. 519 (1997) (showing that search costs
and switching costs have enabled long-distance carriers in the United States to raise prices after the
dissolution of AT&T).
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B. How Can Beneficial Boilerplate Terms Facilitate Collusion?
Let us begin by showing that collusion over harsh boilerplate terms can be less
sustainable than collusion with beneficial competitive boilerplate terms, in which
competitive benefits are offered only to readers. With collusion over harsh boilerplate
terms, suppliers can steal two kinds of consumers by deviating from collusion: readers
of boilerplate terms, who are aware of the harsh terms, and nonreaders of the
boilerplate terms, who find out about them only when the deviating supplier
highlights it. Moreover, both groups of consumers might develop antagonism about
their previous supplier who until then tried to abuse them via harsh boilerplate terms.
This type of collusion is also vulnerable to a court striking down the harsh terms of
one supplier, thereby forcing him to “deviate” from this type of collusion.
On the other hand, when suppliers collude over the salient part of their
contract, and offer competitive benefits only to readers of the boilerplate terms,
deviating from collusion (by offering competitive benefits not only to readers of the
boilerplate provision, but to all customers) becomes less profitable. Such deviation
has the potential of stealing only nonreaders of the boilerplate provision, since readers
of the boilerplate provision already enjoy competitive terms.10 Second, even the
nonreaders of the boilerplate provision would not necessarily switch to the deviating
supplier, since their original supplier could retain them by pointing out to them that
the special discount was in their contract (in a boilerplate) all along. Third, firms often
deviate from collusion in order to exclude their rivals from the market. But as we
show elsewhere,11 a supplier can use beneficial boilerplate terms to credibly signal to
his rivals that he is too efficient to be successfully excluded.
Competitive beneficial boilerplate terms also make price cutting less profitable
compared to a situation where suppliers collude on a uniform price without any
boilerplate provisions. Suppliers’ short-term profits when deviating from collusion
without any boilerplate provisions are larger than their profits when deviating from
collusion with competitive beneficial boilerplate terms. Without boilerplate
10.
In this sense, hiding benefits in boilerplate language is a stronger facilitator of collusion than
price-matching policies, in which the supplier promises to match a rival’s price cut. With price
matching, a price matcher’s rival can still make considerable profits from deviating from collusion, due
to consumers’ hassle in going to the rival and then back to the price matcher in order to invoke the price
match. See Morten Hviid & Greg Shaffer, Hassle Costs: The Achilles’ Heel of Price-Matching
Guarantees, 8 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 489 (1999). In contrast, with hidden benefits in boilerplate
language, the rival cannot steal readers, since they are already enjoying the competitive benefits.
11
See Gilo and Porat, MLR Article, at 1013.
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provisions, the deviating supplier can steal all types of consumers—readers and
nonreaders of boilerplate provisions alike. On the other hand, when suppliers place
competitive benefits in their boilerplate terms a deviating supplier can steal only
nonreaders. Even nonreaders would remain with their current supplier if their current
supplier immediately makes it apparent to them that they could have enjoyed the
benefits hidden in their contract all along. Furthermore, as explained above, to the
extent a supplier wishes to deviate from collusion in order to exclude its rival, it is less
likely to do so when suppliers hide benefits in boilerplate provisions.
Finally, the collusive profits when hiding benefits in boilerplate provisions are
expected to be larger. Without benefits hidden in the boilerplate, many readers end up
not purchasing the product, whereas they would have purchased it with the hidden
benefits. It is true that without hidden benefits, readers who do purchase the product
pay more. Suppliers, however, always have the option of not hiding benefits in their
boilerplate. Hence, if they do so in a particular case, it must be that the former effect
outweighs the latter effect and that it is more profitable to suppliers to hide benefits in
the boilerplate than not to do so.12Accordingly, even if a single firm in an industry
adopts beneficial boilerplate terms, collusion could be facilitated. Beneficial
boilerplate terms adopted by a single supplier make his rivals less eager to cut prices
because their profits from deviating from collusion diminish. It also makes this
supplier less eager to cut prices, because his collusive profits become larger.
[o1]Beneficial boilerplate terms could also be a device that incumbent firms
use to deter entry of new rivals. When a potential entrant observes these terms, he
receives a credible signal as to how far incumbent firms could go with respect to all
consumers in order to fight the entrant if he decides to enter. Absent such beneficial
boilerplate terms, if the entrant is imperfectly informed about incumbents’ costs and
capabilities, the entrant may place a positive probability on the possibility that
incumbents are less efficient or capable than he is. The odds that the entrant would
indeed take his chances and enter are then greater. Once he is in the market, it
becomes harder for incumbents to drive the entrant out, as his costs of entry will have
already been sunk. Thus, beneficial boilerplate acts as a signal to potential entrants of
the incumbent’s propensity to fight back, and it is a less costly signal than offering

12
Alternatively, it might be that suppliers prefer hiding benefits in the boilerplate because collusion
over a uniform price would break down. In such a case too, obviously, it must be that hiding benefits in
the boilerplate facilitates collusion, since under uniform pricing there would be no collusion.
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better deals to all customers. With beneficial boilerplate, the benefits that the
incumbent has to offer his customers in order to keep them are “dormant”—they need
only be exercised if entry occurs.

III. Creating False Appearances
When courts assess a harsh clause in a standard-form contract, they consider
the fairness of the contract in its entirety, and not only the particular clause.13
Accordingly, a supplier who wishes to minimize the chances that a certain term would
be struck down would try to offset it with beneficial terms, which would help
convince the court that the contract in its entirety is fair. This strategy could prove
useful not only vis a vis courts, but also vis a vis the press, consumer organizations, or
competitors who try to criticize the supplier for harsh clauses in its standard-form
contract.
Such offsetting beneficial terms, however, are costly to the supplier. It would
prefer to keep the oppressive terms intact and not have to bear the full cost of the
offsetting beneficial terms. The supplier could achieve this by placing the beneficial
terms in boilerplate language, so that only those who read and fully understand them
would actually enjoy them. The supplier can influence the number of customers that
actually enjoy the beneficial terms by controlling the complexity of their apprehension
and “hiding” them deeper in boilerplate language.
Moreover, at times a supplier who grants some parties certain special benefits
might be interested in hiding these benefits from third parties. For example, a
university who has a standard contract with faculty who are inventors does not want
faculty members who do not have a chance of being inventors, and the public at large,
to observe the extreme benefits granted to the inventors. To achieve this goal the
university could use language which is full of jargon and which is obscure and
difficult to understand.

IV. A Credible Signal for Not Negotiating
In many cases a supplier would like to signal his customers or his competitors
that certain terms in the contract are not negotiable. Standard form terms are a way for

13.
See Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts 260–66 (1999) (explaining that unfairness cannot be
detected by analyzing specific terms as seemingly unfair because these terms are usually concessions
granted in exchange for other advantages).
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a supplier to impose transaction costs upon himself in the event that the contract is
negotiated, thereby credibly committing not to negotiate his contracts. Nonnegotiability of contracts could serve various purposes. We focus here on three
purposes that have received less attention.

A. Signaling Improved Incentives
Non-negotiability of contractual terms could signal that the supplier’s
improved incentives, brought about by maintaining these terms in all or most of the
supplier’s contracts, remain intact.14 For example, a car manufacturer may want to
signal consumers the car’s quality by offering a long term warranty. But in order for
the warranty to credibly signal the car’s quality, the customer has to know that the
warranty applies to all or most customers and cannot be waived easily. After getting
the signal and recognizing the car’s high quality, any given customer may try to waive
the warranty in exchange for a refund. But if many customers do so, the supplier’s
improved incentives would no longer exist. Accordingly, the supplier needs to
credibly commit not to negotiate the warranty.
One way to do so is to commit contractually not to negotiate. This would
usually not be an effective commitment device, however, because customers would
find it hard to monitor the supplier’s relations with all its other customers. An
alternative commitment device, is to use boilerplate provisions or standard-form
contracts to make negotiation over the warranty particularly difficult and complicated.
For example, the boilerplate provisions could provide that the warranty cannot be
waived without prior approval by the CEO or the board, or without following a
cumbersome process. If customers know that all contracts contain this boilerplate,
they would worry less about waivers.
Alternatively, actual contacts with buyers could be made by the supplier’s
agents, and these agents could have no discretion to negotiate the contract. Typically,
such a supplier will operate with standard-form contracts, the terms of which are rigid
and not negotiable. Blocking negotiation by the supplier’s agents could be achieved
either by an explicit rule forbidding negotiation or by filling the boilerplate language
with professional or legal jargon and employing agents that are not capable, or lack
sufficient information or skills, to understand or negotiate the standard terms.
14.

See Baird, supra note, at 2724 (“Unsophisticated consumers are often better off in a market in
which no one can bargain for special terms than in a market where everyone can.”).
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State laws often enable suppliers to submit their standard contracts to a certain
agency or to the state’s attorney general for approval.15 Such submission of a
supplier’s standard contracts enhances their rigidity and negotiation-proofness. This is
because any subsequent change of the contract’s terms would require resubmission to
the state agency for new approval in order to enjoy the legal defenses inherent in such
approval. Also, a very convincing way for a supplier to signal consumers that
negotiating the contract is impossible is by making the transaction through the
Internet, where, obviously, no live agent conducts any type of negotiation.16

B. Signaling Commercial Buyers about Uniformity of Terms
Another case in which a supplier would want to impose upon himself and his
customers costs of negotiating terms is when the supplier wishes to signal to its
customers that prices, or other terms, are uniform for all customers. If a buyer were to
suspect that the supplier is granting special benefits to other buyers he might hesitate
to enter the contract or insist on better terms17 One way the supplier can promise not
to grant discriminatory benefits is to commit contractually not to discriminate.
However, such a commitment is difficult to enforce, and complicated monitoring
mechanisms would have to be constructed. Such mechanisms could also be relatively
easily circumvented by the supplier, by offering subtle or disguised benefits.
A possibly more credible way for the supplier to commit not to discriminate is
by developing uniform contracts and boilerplate provisions that are difficult for the
supplier to negotiate.18 For example, a boilerplate that says:
“NO

LICENSOR,

DISTRIBUTOR,

DEALER,

RETAILER,

RESELLER, SALES PERSON, OR EMPLOYEE IS AUTHORIZED
TO

MODIFY

THIS

AGREEMENT

OR

TO

MAKE

ANY

15.
See, e.g., Plain Language Contract Act, Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 325G.29–.36 (West 2004 & Supp.
2006). Section 325G.35, entitled “Review by the attorney general” states: “Any seller, creditor or lessor
may submit a consumer contract to the attorney general for review as to whether the contract complies
with the requirements of section 325G.31 . . . . Any consumer contract certified pursuant to subdivision
1 is deemed to comply with section 325G.31 . . . .”
16.
See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note, at 468 (“[E]-consumers cannot negotiate because web
pages and installation software do not allow for interaction with a live agent.”).
17.
See David Gilo, Retail Competition Percolating Through to Suppliers and the Use of Vertical
Integration, Tying, and Vertical Restraints To Stop It, 20 Yale J. on Reg. 23, 25–75 (2003), and the
literature cited there, id. at note 9.
18.
Indeed, McAfee and Schwartz claim that franchisors use uniform and rigid contracts with
franchisees in order to better commit not to negotiate them. However, they discuss uniformity alone,
rather than mechanisms that raise the costs of negotiation. McAfee & Schwartz, supra note, at 213.
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REPRESENTATION OR PROMISE THAT IS DIFFERENT FROM,
OR IN ADDITION TO, THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT”
helps the seller credibly commit not to negotiate.19

C. Signaling Competitors about Uniformity of Terms
Firms often like to commit to being less aggressive and less eager to cut prices
in order to induce rivals to compete less aggressively as well. They can do so by
making their terms of sale rigid and costly to change. When changing terms of sale vis
a vis particular buyers involves high transaction costs, a supplier who wants to offer
more competitive terms than his rivals would have to change his standard form
contract with regard to all buyers. But such a competitive move would be less
profitable to the supplier, since it is more detectable to his rivals and they would
respond more quickly.20 This could improve the prospects of tacit collusion in the
supplier’s industry in the first place.

V. The Legal Implications of Hiding Benefits in the Boilerplate
Identifying the various uses of boilerplate language and artificial transaction
costs imposed on buyers raises the question of whether these uses are desirable from a
social point of view. If the answer is negative, a second question arises: should the law
intervene and if so, by what means? The analysis in Sections I-IV reveals that there
are two specific practices that may raise legal concerns that have been ignored by the
current literature and by courts. The first is the practice of artificially complicating the
transaction in ways that benefit suppliers at the expense of buyers, and the second is
the practice of hiding benefits in the boilerplate. In what follows, we shall focus on
the policy implications of the latter.

A. Price Discrimination
We argued that hidden benefits could be used to price discriminate between
readers of the boilerplate and nonreaders. This practice raises objections from both a

19.

This term is taken from the standard form contract of Novell, a software vendor. See
http://www.novell.com/licensing/eula/securelogin_35.pdf. It shows how the supplier may also want to
credibly commit toward noncommercial consumers that he will not discriminate among them.
20.
Unlike clauses like most-favored-nation, that also facilitate tacit collusion, but are difficult to
implement and could draw antitrust scrutiny, the strategy of term-rigidity and difficulty of negotiation
could more easily and credibly be implemented and does not currently draw antitrust attention.
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social-welfare perspective and from the perspective of consumers who are adversely
affected by the discrimination. We discuss these two perspectives separately.
Social Welfare Perspective. Recall that discrimination via beneficial
boilerplate terms causes readers to pay less (or receive more) and causes non-readers
to pay more (or receive less) than in the case with uniform pricing. Accordingly, in
order to assess whether such discrimination is welfare-reducing the court needs to
examine whether discrimination raised or reduced the total number of units sold by
the supplier. But since various other factors affect the number of units sold, this would
be practically impossible. Accordingly, we believe that intervention should hinge not
merely on the discriminatory nature of beneficial boilerplate terms but rather on their
other two uses: harming competition and creating the appearance of a fair contract.
The Discriminated Consumer Perspective. One possible claim a nonreader
could invoke against the supplier is that the supplier failed to disclose to him that
other consumers got a better deal than the one he got. In particular, the nonreader
could claim that this undisclosed fact is a material part of the bargain, and since the
supplier failed to disclose it, the consumer is entitled to rescind the contract or even
sue for damages or enforce the beneficial terms in his favor.
There are numerous consumer protection statutes that impose duties of
disclosure. However, most of these statutes oblige suppliers to disclose exclusionary
clauses, limitations on explicit or implicit warranties, and many other terms that could
constitute “a (bad) surprise” to a consumer who does not, or cannot, read boilerplate
provisions carefully enough.21 Such statutes are not relevant to our case, since we are
dealing here with “good” surprises. Other statutes, prevailing in several states, impose
a duty on suppliers to draft consumers’ contracts in plain language.22 Such statutes
could be of relevance here, as long as the transaction costs consumers need to incur in
order to reveal the benefits in boilerplate provisions stem from difficulties in
understanding the wording of the contract.
The common law also imposes upon a supplier a duty of disclosure in
appropriate cases. In certain special cases, the consumer may have reasonable
expectations—stemming from his special or long-term relationship with the supplier
21.

For Instance, the Truth in Lending Act is aimed at increasing disclosure of credit costs to
borrowers. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–07(c) (2000). Similarly, the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act mandates that an applicant for credit is entitled to disclosures explaining the reasons
why credit has been denied or revoked. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)–(f) (2000).
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or from a promise or representation made by the supplier—that he would disclose any
material fact of the bargain to the consumer.23 In such special cases, regardless of the
welfare analysis we conducted above, there could be grounds under contract law for
the consumer to rescind the contract due to nondisclosure of the hidden benefits,24 and
even, in appropriate cases, to sue for damages or to enforce the beneficial terms on his
behalf.25

B. Using Beneficial Boilerplate Terms to Harm Competition
We argued in Section II that beneficial boilerplate terms, even if adopted by
only one supplier, could harm competition by making tacit or explicit collusion more
sustainable. Note that when the practice is banned, if collusion breaks down,
nonreaders and readers of the boilerplate provisions alike enjoy competitive terms.
This means that the collusion-facilitating characteristic of beneficial boilerplate terms
is unambiguously harmful. Similar are the anticompetitive harms from beneficial
boilerplate provisions that encourage anticompetitive accommodation by rivals or
deter entry.
Accordingly, while the mere discriminatory characteristics of beneficial
boilerplate terms do not justify intervention, when beneficial boilerplate terms are
adopted by suppliers in an oligopolistic setting the case for legal intervention is
strengthened. Naturally, the most appropriate legal tools to deal with such effects are
the antitrust laws. We examine a host of possible antitrust tools elsewhere.26 Within
contract law doctrine, a possible approach would be to allow nonreaders of boilerplate
language to attack the supplier for violating disclosure requirements. We noted above
that such an approach would usually be unwarranted if the plaintiff’s sole claim was
22.

See, e.g., Plain Language Contract Act, Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 325G.29–36 (2005) (enacted in

1981).
23.

See generally United States ex rel. Bussen Quarries, Inc. v. Thomas, 938 F.2d 831, 834 (8th Cir.
1991); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Little Rock, Ark., 774 F.2d
909, 913 (8th Cir. 1985); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161 (1981); Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 551 (1977).
24.
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 303(b) (1981); Restatement of Restitution § 8 cmt. e,
§ 28 (1937); Farnsworth, supra note, §§ 4.11, 4.15 (discussing the effects of nondisclosure and the
remedies for misrepresentation).
25.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551 (1977), Farnsworth, supra note, at § 4.15. When the
beneficial boilerplate term involves warranties, a suit by a nonreader may be brought also for breach of
an implied warranty. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act §§ 104, 108, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2304(e), 2308
(2000) (stating that the supplier cannot disclaim implied warranties, and if the supplier designates a
written warranty as “full,” it must meet stated requirements, including an undertaking to provide a
remedy without charge by repair, replacement, or refund); Farnsworth, supra note, at § 4.29.
26
See Gilo and Porat, MLR Article, at 1025-29.
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that he was the victim of price discrimination. In cases in which the practice facilitates
cartels, raises prices, or deters entry, however, intervention through disclosure rules
becomes warranted. Another contract law doctrine that could be invoked when
boilerplate is shown to harm competition is to declare such contracts unenforceable
for public policy considerations, as done with other types of anticompetitive
agreements.27
To be sure, we are not advocating here a per se prohibition of beneficial
boilerplate terms adopted by oligopolistic suppliers. Suppliers should be allowed to
claim, in a particular case, that the practice involves welfare-enhancing attributes that
outweigh the potential anticompetitive harm. The court would then face the nontrivial
task of balancing between the probable anticompetitive threat and the welfareenhancing benefits. Such balancing is extremely familiar to courts in antitrust cases
involving conduct that is not illegal per se but still raises considerable anticompetitive
concerns.

. Creating the Appearance of a Fair Contract
We argued in Section III above that beneficial boilerplate terms raise policy
concerns even absent an oligopolistic setting, when they are used by the supplier to
create a false appearance of a fair contract, that is, when the benefits are not enjoyed
by most consumers. Courts that review standard-form contracts should be aware of
this. Therefore, when courts consider a standard-form contract, they should look not
only at the appearance of the contract and at its theoretical potential to be fair, but
rather at its fairness in fact, given the transaction costs imposed on consumers who
may want to enjoy its beneficial terms.

Conclusion
Unlike much of previous literature, this chapter did not focus on the
asymmetric information between the supplier and consumers created by boilerplate
language that includes harsh terms. We focused on other benefits the supplier can
derive from the transaction costs that boilerplate language and standard-form
contracts create. Because the costs of reading and understanding boilerplate are borne
differently by different consumers, suppliers can set these costs to screen out

27.

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188.

19

unwanted consumers, price discriminate, stabilize cartels, elicit consumer preferences,
and hide benefits granted to certain consumers. Boilerplate also serves to self-impose
transaction costs by the supplier, in order to signal to buyers or to its competitors that
negotiation of the contract would be very costly. Other uses of boilerplate create
asymmetry of information between the supplier and its consumers, as in the classic
discussions of standard forms, but they differ in that they do not extract surplus from
uninformed consumers directly. Rather, they operate indirectly, as a cartel-facilitating
tool, an anticompetitive signaling device, or a tool for creating the appearance of a fair
contract.
Some of the uses of boilerplate language and transaction costs that we identify
are desirable (such as signaling not to negotiate a warranty) and some are not (such as
facilitating ethnic discrimination, artificially complicating the contract in order to
harm competition, and creating a false appearance of a fair contract). Most of the uses,
however, are in between these two polarities, and their desirability depends on the
particular circumstances of the case (such as some cases of screening out small
buyers, some cases of price discrimination, and some cases of collecting information
about consumer preferences).
We identified two practices that especially raise policy concerns. The first is
the practice of artificially complicating the transaction, and the second is the practice
of hiding benefits in the boilerplate. These concerns are new to the legal scholarship
and case law and should be addressed by courts in appropriate cases. Part V of the
chapter approached the question of whether and when the use of beneficial boilerplate
terms is desirable from a social perspective, and if not, we ask how the law should
discourage them.
It is hard to verify whether suppliers are really trying to achieve most or all of
the different goals discussed in this chapter. But even if suppliers are completely
ignorant of these goals and uses, it is still important to be aware of the consequences,
even if unintended, of using boilerplate language and artificially raising transaction
costs. The aim of this Chapter was to illuminate these consequences.
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